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Abstract
Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence have produced
agents that can beat human world champions at games like
Go, Starcraft, and Dota2. However, most of these models do
not seem to play in a human-like manner: People infer oth-
ers’ intentions from their behaviour, and use these inferences in
scheming and strategizing. Here, using a Bayesian Theory of
Mind (ToM) approach, we investigated how much an explicit
representation of others’ intentions improves performance in a
cooperative game. We compared the performance of humans
playing with optimal-planning agents with and without ToM,
in a cooperative game where players have to flexibly cooper-
ate to achieve joint goals. We find that teams with ToM agents
significantly outperform non-ToM agents when collaborating
with all types of partners: non-ToM, ToM, as well as human
players, and that the benefit of ToM increases the more ToM
agents there are. These findings have implications for design-
ing better cooperative agents.
Keywords: Bayesian Theory of Mind; Multi-Agent Games;
Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
Introduction
In recent years, we have seen tremendous advancements in
Artificial Intelligence (AI) that have produced agents that can
beat human world champions at competitive games such as
Go (Silver et al., 2016), StarCraft II (Vinyals et al., 2019),
and Dota2 (OpenAI et al., 2019). Indeed, researchers have
now produced agents that can solve many aspects of com-
plex games once thought to be well outside the realm of ar-
tificial intelligence, including games involving imperfect in-
formation (Hanabi; Lerer, Hu, Foerster, & Brown, 2020), hid-
den player roles (Avalon: The Resistance; Serrino, Kleiman-
Weiner, Parkes, & Tenenbaum, 2019), and even negotia-
tions (Lewis, Yarats, Dauphin, Parikh, & Batra, 2017; Mell,
Gratch, Baarslag, Aydog˘an, & Jonker, 2018).
Despite this impressive progress, the vast majority of these
AI agents do not seem to be playing these games in the
same manner that humans do. Consider Deep Reinforcement
Learning (RL), which was used to train many of these im-
pressive game-playing feats. RL agents start off tabula rasa
with no knowledge of rules or strategies, and learn to play the
game via trial-and-error in self-play; instances of agents are
pitted against each other, and the actions used by the more
successful agents are integrated into tried-and-tested strate-
gies. The introduction of deep neural networks (and better
search methods) to learn complex non-linear approximations
of the “value” of states and actions have enabled deep RL
agents to tackle increasingly complex games in recent years
(e.g., Silver et al., 2018; Carroll et al., 2019). However, while
human players also learn by trial-and-error, they learn much
faster than deep RL agents. People also, by contrast, start off
with more complex representations of rules and strategies—
e.g., whether another social agent is “helping” or “hindering”
(Ullman et al., 2009)—which consequently help humans to
learn more quickly and generalize better than the current state
of modern AI, given the same amount of game-play experi-
ence. Although there is no denying the performance of deep
RL agents at these complex games, one has to wonder if, by
incorporating principles of human learning and reasoning into
these models, we can further improve these agents and per-
haps overcome some of their present limitations.
One promising approach to a more human-like game-
playing agent lies in explicitly modelling intentions. Re-
cent work in the Bayesian Theory of Mind (Baker, Jara-
Ettinger, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2017) framework has modelled
how laypeople infer the intentions and preferences (Baker,
Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009), intuitive rewards and costs (Jara-
Ettinger, Gweon, Schulz, & Tenenbaum, 2016), knowledge
states (Baker et al., 2017), social goals (Ullman et al., 2009),
and even emotions (Ong, Zaki, & Goodman, 2019) and utter-
ance pragmatics (Goodman & Frank, 2016) of other agents
from their behaviour. In this computational cognitive mod-
elling framework, based on folk belief-desire psychology
(e.g., Wellman & Woolley, 1990), agents are assumed to be
rational, utility-maximizing agents who choose their actions
to maximize their utility given their latent preferences and
knowledge about the world. Then, by observing an agent’s
actions, an independent observer can infer the agent’s under-
lying motivation, such as intentions, by using Bayes’ rule.
The work thus far in Bayesian ToM have mostly been fo-
cused on explaining human observer inferences—i.e., mod-
eling how people infer the intentions of other agents—and
they have not yet studied how these inferences can then be
incorporated into a decision-making model and used to im-
prove coordination. We note also that computer scientists
have studied such nested reasoning models using Partially
Observerable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs, e.g.,
Doshi & Gmytrasiewicz, 2009; Gopalan & Tellex, 2015), but
they have not empirically compared them with human per-
formance. Here, we address these gaps by (i) implementing
a Bayesian ToM-inspired POMDP model in a collaborative
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setting with humans, and (ii) empirically comparing the per-
formance of humans with agents with and without a ToM.
In this work, we investigate how well an explicit represen-
tation of intentions benefit cooperation. We chose a game
where players work together without communication to max-
imize team score, but where the task allocation is fluid. That
is, Tasks A, B, and C are required to accomplish a goal, but
any of the agents can accomplish any of the tasks. Impor-
tantly, we hypothesize that in such an environment with fluid
and flexible task allocation and in the absence of explicit com-
munication, agents with an explicit ToM would be signifi-
cantly better partners than optimal planners with no ToM.
To illustrate, consider the task of two (or more!) chefs
preparing a meal without any form of communication, head
chef giving orders, and without any prior history working
together1. Vegetables need to be collected and chopped;
chopped vegetables need to be cooked; cooked meals need
to be served. A little Theory of Mind—along with several as-
sumptions that everyone is cooperative and optimal—can go
a long way: Bob is standing closest to the vegetables, and ev-
eryone can reason that Bob can reach the vegetables the ear-
liest, and so Bob may be the optimal choice to prepare them.
Bob then starts walking to the vegetables, which other agents
can then take as a confirmation that indeed, Bob is preparing
the vegetables—in fact, Bob knows that the others know that
Bob is taking this task. The other agents can then proceed to
address other tasks. In such a manner, seamless cooperation
may emerge naturally out of rational, cooperative agents with
a Theory of Mind, even in the absence of communication.
To test this idea, we chose to build an environment inspired
by the popular multiplayer party game, Overcooked2. Play-
ers (or our AI) each control a chef in a kitchen, and have
to prepare specific meals, earning points for each success-
ful dish served (Fig. 1). We note that this same game was
also recently and independently studied with deep RL agents
(Carroll et al., 2019), which we return to in the discussion.
We tested teams of human players along with AI with and
without a Theory of Mind, and we find that ToM agents are
more effective teammates than non-ToM agents. Further-
more, ToM agents seem to be more effective on maps where
there are large distances between subtasks, and hence larger
effort-savings by inferring others’ intentions. Finally, simula-
tions with more than two agents also showed that ToM agents
work even better in teams with other ToM agents.
Bayesian Theory of Mind in cooperation
In this section, we lay out the design of a rational planner
agent with no Theory of Mind (nToM), as well as its coun-
terpart with a ToM. For both, we use a Markov Decision Pro-
cess (MDP) formulation. The nToM agent completely ob-
1Of course, one solution to coordination without communication
is extensive training with Standard Operating Procedures, as is done
in many high-stakes domains like the military, fire-fighting, and
high-end restaurant kitchens. Here, we do not address pre-training.
2Overcooked is a 2016 cooking simulation game developed by
Ghost Town Games and published by Team17.
serves the world state but is oblivious to other agents’ inten-
tions, while the ToM agent models other agents’ intentions as
a partially-observable component of the world. A Partially-
Observable MDP consists of 〈S,A,T,R,Ω,O〉, where
• S denotes a finite set of states of the physical environ-
ment (i.e., x,y positions of each agent, goal locations)
• A denotes a finite set of actions, i.e., movement in
eight directions (up, up-right, right, ...) and five ‘task ac-
tions’ (pick up, drop, chop, cook, serve).
• T is the state-transition function, where T(s,a,s′)
gives the probability of ending in state s′, given that the
agent starts in state s and executes action a.
• R : S×A 7→ R is the reward function, providing the
immediate reward gained by the agent for taking each ac-
tion in each state.
• Ω: is the finite set of latent intentions the observer
infers from the world and observed actions.
• O : S×A 7→Π(Ω) is the observation function, i.e., the
inference function, which specifies a probability distribu-
tion over possible inferences, given the current world state
and the current actions.
Decomposing goals into subtasks. In four of our five
maps, we used the same simple recipe: one needs to pick,
chop, and cook three (3) onions in the same pot, and then
serve the Onion Soup to get points. (In the fifth map, we
had a mixed vegetable soup where instead of 3 onions, there
are 3 different vegetables). Thus, the goal of serving a Soup
can be broken down into several sub-tasks, which have their
own pre-requisite conditions. For example, an agent has to be
holding a raw, unchopped ingredient and standing next to the
chopping board before they can “Chop”. We structured these
sub-tasks as a Directed Acyclic Graph (Fig. 2) to specify the
dependencies between the sub-tasks to accomplish the goal.
Rational Planner Agent (nToM). The rational planner
agent (without a ToM) plans optimally: It knows all the
shared goals, such as how many soup orders are pending, as
well as the state of all possible subtasks. Agents earn points
only for completing the entire goal, so we added internal re-
wards to incentivize agents to prioritize completing each or-
der before going to the next one, i.e., finishing subtasks lead-
ing to one goal before starting the next goal. We chose to give
more internal rewards to ‘later’ subtasks: 10 for picking an
ingredient, 20 for chopping, 40 for cooking, 50 for scooping
and 100 for serving. These internal rewards are not added to
the total score, and are used solely for subtask prioritization.
Agents compute the utility of all subtasks g as the internal
reward R′(g), less the cost of completing that subtask from
the current state s: c(g|s). We used a cost of 1 per step, and
no cost for actions (pick...). Agents then choose subtasks pro-
portional to their utility, via a softmax decision-rule:
P(g|s) ∝ exp[β(R′(g)− c(g|s))] (1)
where the optimality parameter β controls agent behaviour:
agents approach strictly rational behaviour as β → ∞, and
Figure 1: Experimental layouts. Maps (a) and (b) provide large open spaces with tasks located at the boundaries. Maps (c) and
(d) give asymmetric task advantages to each player. Map (e) introduces a winding circuit that increases the traveling cost to
various tasks, making it even more important to minimize redundancy.
Figure 2: Directed Graph showing the subtask dependencies
for the goal of serving a Soup
completely random behaviour when β = 0. Here, we set
β = 0.5. Finally, after choosing a subtask, agents then use
A* Search as a heuristic best-first search to find the shortest
path(s) to that subtask, giving P(a|g,s).
Theory of Mind Agent. The ToM agent model proceeds
in two steps. First, it infers what the other agent’s possible
intentions are. Second, it then incorporates the other agent’s
intentions into its own planning model. We note that we only
consider one level of nesting here (Baker et al., 2017); that is,
ToM agents reason about other agents only, and do not recur-
sively reason about other agents reasoning about themselves.
Given the world state at the previous time-step s, and other
agents’ last action a, the ToM model infers the posterior of
agents’ subtasks g using Bayes’ rule:
P(g|a,s) = P(a|g,s)P(g|s)
P(a|s) =
P(a|g,s)P(g|s)
∑g′∈G P(a|g′,s)P(g′,s)
(2)
We used as a non-informative prior3, a uniform distribu-
tion over P(g|s). To solve this posterior inference, the ToM
model would, for each other agent, sample each subtask a
hundred times, and for each subtask compute the most-likely
actions that the agent would take P(a|g,s). The model then
conditions on which action was actually observed to com-
pute P(g|a,s). Finally, to allow for a non-zero probability for
unlikely actions, we used Laplace smoothing and added one
count to each possible action.
The next step after inferring other agents’ subtasks, is coor-
dination planning: that is, using the other agents’ subtasks to
coordinate one’s own actions. The ToM agent “plans” from
the perspective of other agents and calculates their expected
utilities of each subtask (Reward − Cost to get there). In
the event where the ToM agent’s chosen subtask g′ returns
higher reward for another agent, it would then choose to aban-
don subtask g′. Interestingly, given that all agents receive the
same subtask rewards, this boils down to comparing relative
distances to the subtasks, and so this decision-rule can also
be explained by a simple heuristic: If both the ToM agent and
another agent have the same subtask g′ in mind and the other
agent is closer to g′, then the ToM agent will abandon g′, as-
suming that the other agent will take care of it. Basically, if
my partner is closer, they have it covered, and I can move
onto another task. If the ToM agent abandons g′, it will then
remove g′ from its list of available subtasks, and then re-plan
3We considered using expected utility as in Eqn. 1 to model the
prior P(g|s), but chose to leave it uninformative as a conservative
choice for modelling human players.
for the next subtask. By avoiding these conflicts, ToM agents
would then be able to reduce redundant steps (e.g., both chas-
ing after the same subtask when only one is needed) during
collaborative goal pursuit.
Experiment
We designed five maps for our cooperative game to vary in
difficulty and with certain characteristics that we predicted
would impact cooperation (Fig. 1). The first two maps, Fig.
1 (a) and (b), provide vast, open spaces where subtasks are
relatively far from each other. Maps (c) and (d) provide asym-
metric subtask advantages for each player. For example, for
the left agent, the distance from the cooking pots to the serv-
ing point is shorter. Finally, Map (e) has a winding circuit
that increases the distance to certain tasks, such as picking
ingredients, which incentivizes taking fewer redundant steps.
The map also allows more sophisticated cooperation strate-
gies: For instance, one agent could pick and chop the onion (1
step), while the other agent could pick up the chopped onion
from the other side of the chopping board to bring it to the
cooking pot (3 steps), compared to the first agent doing ev-
erything (8 steps)4.
We recruited N=111 (Mean age = 22.58, 49.5% female)
participants, who were randomly assigned to three con-
ditions: Human-nToM (N=27 individuals), Human-ToM
(N=28 individuals), and Human-Human (N=28 pairs). Af-
ter giving consent, participants were shown a screenshot of
the game and were briefed about the objectives and the key
commands, which were also indicated on the keyboard. Par-
ticipants then played a short training round of 150 time-steps
to familiarize themselves with the game: each time-step cor-
responds to taking 1 step in the game. Following this, partic-
ipants played all 5 maps, each for 500 time-steps. The order
in which participants played the maps was randomized across
participants. Participants in the Human-Human condition
were not allowed to discuss any strategies or even commu-
nicate: verbal exclamations, eye-contact, and gestures were
prohibited. This was to ensure the fairness of comparing re-
sults across the other conditions since our AI agents were nei-
ther able to communicate with humans nor with themselves.
To compare the performance of the Human conditions with
all-agent conditions, we additionally ran simulations for three
more AI-only conditions: nToM-nToM (N=30 runs), ToM-
nToM (N=30 runs), and ToM-ToM (N=30 runs). The num-
ber of runs were chosen to match the sample size in the Hu-
man conditions, rounding off to 30.
Results
We present the averaged scores by conditions in Fig. 3. As we
expected, participants in the Human-Human condition scored
the highest, while agents in the nTom-nToM condition per-
formed the worst amongst all the conditions. For reference,
4Post-hoc qualitative analysis suggested that some humans pairs
do learn and successfully apply this particular strategy, but none of
our AI agents (could have) learnt this.
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Figure 3: Average score by condition. Error bars represent
between-subject 95% Confidence Intervals averaged over
maps, which visually under-estimates the between-condition
effects from a repeated-measures analysis. * indicate signifi-
cant a priori predicted comparisons, all p < .001.
successfully serving one dish the instant it appears earns play-
ers 150 points, but this decreases by 1 per time-step (so serv-
ing a dish 50 time-steps after the order appears will earn 100
points). This is also the only way to earn points.
We expected that ToM agents would be better cooperators
and hence produce higher results than nToM agents. This is
formalized in three a priori hypotheses, all contrasting a ToM
agent with a nToM agent: [1] Human-ToM > Human-nToM,
[2] ToM-ToM > ToM-nToM, and [3] ToM-nToM > nToM-
nToM. To test these hypotheses, we made dummy variables
that corresponded to these specific contrasts (e.g., a dummy
that is 1 if Human-ToM and 0 if Human-nToM for contrast
[1], and we looked only at the subset of data in these two
conditions), and fit linear mixed-effects models with random
intercepts by player and by map, to control for the repeated-
measures nature of the data. As we expected, all of the com-
parisons were significant. ToM agents were better coopera-
tors than nToM agents when playing with humans (compari-
son [1], b = 121.8 [95% CI: 69.7,173.9], t = 4.58, p < .001),
playing with other ToM agents (comparison [2], b = 60.9
[50.2,71.6], t = 11.2, p < .001), or playing with other nToM
agents (comparison [3], b = 26.8 [16.5,37.1], t = 5.1, p <
.001). For visual reference, these comparisons are indicated
with an ∗ in Fig. 3, going from right to left.
Map features. Next, we examined performance on each
map. There were large differences in mean performances
across the maps: mean nTom-nTom performance was lowest
for maps (a) [131 points] and (b) [200 points], then map (e)
[420 points], (d) [690 points] and (c) [998 points].
However, we were most interested in features of the maps
that ToM agents were able to exploit, hence we looked at
maps with the highest (relative) ToM > nToM difference. In
Fig. 4, we plot the normalized score for each map separately,
where we normalized all the scores by dividing by the mean
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Figure 4: Normalized score by condition, for each map separately. The arrangement of the bars are identical to Fig. 3; Please
refer to Fig. 3 for the horizontal axis labels, which are omitted for clarity. Scores are normalized such that nToM-nToM is 1.0,
to better illustrate the replication of the pattern of results in Fig. 3. Error bars represent between-subject 95% CI.
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Figure 5: Simulation results for 2-agents (left), 3-agents
(middle) and 4-agents (right) games. Colors on adjacent bars
represent increasing number of agents with ToM.
nTom-nTom performance in that map, so the nTom-nTom nor-
malized score is 1.0, and we can examine the ToM benefit as
a relative improvement. We find that the ToM benefit is the
largest in maps (a), (b), and (e). We suggest that this could be
due to large distances between subtasks, which greatly bene-
fited ToM agents who expend less effort going after subtasks
that other agents are also pursuing. Surprisingly, this did not
happen in maps (c) and (d) though we expected ToM to be
more efficient as well at exploiting asymmetries in the map.
Simulations with more than two agents. Finally, in or-
der to investigate the benefits of a ToM when the number of
agents increase, we ran additional simulations with more than
two agents, varying the number of ToM agents in the team.
Specifically, we ran four different three-agent conditions (0-
ToM-of-3, 1-ToM-of-3, 2-ToM-of-3, and 3-ToM-of-3, and
five different four-agent conditions (0-ToM-of-4, 1-ToM-of-
4, 2-ToM-of-4, 3-ToM-of-4, and 4-ToM-of-4). We ran 9 sim-
ulation runs per map for each three-agent condition, and 2
runs per map for each four-agent condition.
We show the results from these multi-agent simulations in
Fig. 5. From the graph, and from running a linear-mixed
effects model with random effects by map, we notice two
main effects, which are both expected and highly significant.
Increasing the number of agents increases the team score
(b = 378 [364,392], t = 51.9, p < .001), and, for the same
number of agents in the team, increasing the number of ToM
agents also increases the team score (b = 53.8 [45.8,61.9],
t = 13.1, p < .001).
In running these simulations, we were interested in whether
ToM agents actually benefit teams more when there are al-
ready ToM agents, as we hypothesized that ToM agents are
better able to cooperate with other ToM agents. This led us to
test for an interaction between the number of agents and the
number of ToM agents. Indeed, we found a significant pos-
itive interaction (b = 15.7 [3.7,27.7], t = 2.49, p = 0.011).
This suggests that imbuing each rational planner agent in the
team with a Theory of Mind has a super-additive, synergis-
tic effect: the more agents there are that reason about other
agents’ goals, the more effectively they can work together.
Discussion
In this paper we empirically investigated the benefit of adding
an explicit Theory of Mind to rational planning agents in
a cooperative environment where the allocation of subtasks,
needed to accomplish a goal, to agents is fluid. In such an
environment, where any agent can accomplish any subtask,
a ToM allows more efficient cooperation by reducing redun-
dancy: if I see a teammate walk towards subtask X, I infer
their intentions, assume they can handle it, and now I can
turn my attention to other subtasks. We showed that ToM
agents improve team scores when they play with humans,
ToM agents, and non-ToM agents, and that this benefit in-
creases when the environment has large distances between
subtasks, translating to larger effort-savings with a ToM. Fi-
nally, we also showed via simulations of more than 2 agents,
that the benefits of ToM scale synergistically; ToM agents
contribute even more effectively when there are already other
ToM agents on the team.
It is impressive that we find these strong results even
though our study has much room for improvement. First,
our model had several parameters (e.g., softmax β, internal
rewards for reward shaping) that were not optimized to data.
Second, we used only one level of ToM reasoning, although
previous studies in humans have shown that one to two lev-
els is sufficient, and it may not be computationally-efficient
to recurse until convergence. Finally, ToM agents do not act
knowing that others are reasoning about them—we used a
simple rule for coordination planning that had ToM agents
give up subtasks that gave higher utility to and were likely
to be accomplished by others. One can imagine more so-
phisticated reasoning that involves ToM agents acting on the
assumption that other agents similarly reason about their in-
tentions. Despite this not being made explicit in our models,
we still find a synergistic benefit of ToM agents working with
other ToM agents.
We motivated this paper by reviewing how much progress
deep RL agents have made in game-playing. Indeed, Carroll
et al. (2019) recently and independently studied a similar en-
vironment, and proposed several RL training regimes to train
agents to play with humans. We think that deep RL and ToM
rational planner approaches have much to offer each other,
and they are in fact, complementary rather than competing.
Our current agents cannot learn new strategies like RL (such
as dropping ingredients on counters to pass them to other
agents), but can play (well) with humans without any train-
ing. Future work should look at integrating deep RL and ToM
approaches to leverage the advantages of each approach.
In sum, there is much utility from building social, cooper-
ative agents that can better reason about human partners. Our
work shows that an explicit representation of intentions can
dramatically boost performance in a dynamic context where
subtask allocation is fluid.
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